Two competing non-differentiated platforms bring together sellers and buyers who face the discrete choice problem which platform to visit. Platforms charge listing fees to sellers for their service. If competition between sellers is soft, only agglomeration equilibria exist, i.e. all sellers and buyers locate on one platform. By contrast, if competition between sellers is fierce, in the unique equilibrium, buyers and sellers segment, and sellers enjoy a monopoly position vis-a-vis buyers. This allows platforms to obtain strictly positive profits in equilibrium. If competition between sellers is moderate, in the unique equilibrium, buyers and sellers segment with positive probability. This equilibrium features dispersion of listing fees. We characterize the equilibrium and extend the analysis to allow for multi-homing sellers and buyers.
Introduction
In many industries, platforms play the essential role to enable transactions between buyers and sellers. As trade migrates from physical venues to the Internet, platforms increasingly serve as intermediaries for purchase decisions. For example, in the rental market, the main bulk of matching of landlords and tenants is done via Internet platforms such as Craigslist in the US, Rightmove and Zoopla in the UK, or Immobilienscout24 and Immowelt in German speaking countries. Another example is the used car market, where a large fraction of transactions is initiated via portals.
However, the market structure differs considerably across industries and space. For example, in the US, Craigslist dominates the market in several cities, foremost in the bay area. Buyers and sellers almost exclusively choose this portal, leaving other platforms only specialized market niches. The dominance of a single platform may not come as a surprise, as Craigslist is non-profit and charges low fees. By contrast, in the UK and Germany, the market is segmented and two (or more) platforms have non-negligible market shares.
Due to positive cross-group external effects between buyers and sellers, it has been recognized that platforms have the tendency to tip (as shown by Jullien, 2001, 2003) . This explains the phenomenon of market agglomeration, where all buyers and sellers choose one platform over the other. However, as the examples above indicate, in several industries two or more platforms have non-negligible market shares. A possible explanation is that platforms offer differentiated matching services and, therefore, are active in the market (e.g., Tirole, 2003, and Armstrong, 2006) . However, in the above examples (and more broadly for many Internet platforms) there appears to be little room for differentiation, that is, platforms offer homogeneous services to their customers. In this case, it is unclear how multiple platforms can survive, and it is puzzling that they compete with each other for several years without tipping taking place. In this paper, we resolve the puzzle how multiple homogeneous platforms can survive in an industry that exhibits strong positive network externalities.
Our explanation is based on endogenous differentiation of competitive sellers via their platform choice. We present a theoretical model in which sellers and buyers decide on which platform to be active. 1 If sellers locate on the same platform, it is optimal for buyers to do the same. An agglomeration equilibrium arises. Buyers are then informed about all offers, implying that sellers are in competition with each other. However, if competition between sellers in the same industry is sufficiently intense, they prefer to be active on different platforms. Then, consumers also prefer to be active on different platforms, which implies that single-homing consumers do not become informed about all offers on the market. This relaxes seller competition on each platform. Hence, platforms allow for segmentation of the product market and obtain positive profits for playing this role.
We show that using the natural selection criterion of profit dominance of sellers in addition to Strong Nash Equilibrium yields a unique equilibrium.This allows us to make predictions under which conditions an agglomeration and under which conditions a segmentation equilibrium exists. First, we obtain that if the degree of competition between sellers is low, segmentation cannot occur and tipping prevails. Sellers obtain a higher demand from consumers in the agglomeration equilibrium because all consumers are exposed to all offers by sellers. This increased-demand effect dominates the increasedcompetition effect. Platforms compete fiercely to win the market. This leads to a
Bertrand-style competition between platforms, and their listing fees are driven down to zero.
By contrast, if the degree of competition between sellers is high, segmentation occurs.
Sellers use the platforms to avoid competition with their rivals in the product market.
Platforms serve the role of segmenting the market and receive positive margins for providing this service. Thus, depending on the degree of competition between sellers, very different market structures can emerge and our paper provides clear predictions how the competitive environment between sellers drives the market structure.
If the degree of competition between sellers is moderate, we show that a mixedstrategy equilibrium in listing fees occur. This equilibrium might consist of two disjoint segments of fees. The upper segment of fees are charged if a platform intends to segment the market. By contrast, a listing fee in the lower segment is charged if the platform intends to agglomerate agents on its platform. In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, platforms segment the market with positive probability. We demonstrate that the probability for segmentation taking place increases if the degree of competition between sellers gets larger. Our result therefore contributes to the explanation of why different market structures emerge in industries with similar competitive conditions.
Interestingly, the mixed-strategy equilibrium contains one or two mass points. The logic behind the best-response dynamic in our model is similar to that of BertrandEdgeworth cycles. In our case, if a platform sets a high listing fee, the rival's optimal response is to set a fee which is lower by a discrete amount to induce agglomeration.
The best response of the platform is then to lower its fee slightly to induce segmentation.
The rival's optimal response to lower its fee slightly to induce agglomeration again, and so on. This tendency goes on until the fee of the platform with the lower fee is so low that it prefers to set a discretely higher fee than the other platform in order to induce segmentation instead of lowering its fee further. In contrast to Bertrand-Edgeworth Table 1 : Apartment offers in ascending order of the rental price
Although some consumers may multi-home on both platforms, we expect that many of them single-home, as it is time-consuming to conduct searches on various platforms.
As a consequence, the listing behavior of sellers gives rise to segmentation of sellers, which dampens competition. Such segmentation is inefficient because network effects are not fully exploited and, with price-sensitive demand, the deadweight loss is higher than under agglomeration due to to higher product market prices.
While our base model features single-homing on both sides of the market, we allow for multi-homing sellers and buyers in our extensions and show that our solution to the puzzle that multiple platforms are active (and profitable) carries over to those settings.
First, we consider the case in which some (but not all) buyers multi-home. The intuition for the existence of the segmentation equilibrium remains: the remaining single-homing consumers do not observe all offers, which dampens competition on the product market.
Hence, if the degree of competition is fierce, firms prefer segmentation over agglomeration and platforms can demand positive listing fees in equilibrium. The sellers' and platform's profit from multi-homing consumers depends on the trade-off between increased competition brought about by multi-homing and a higher demand because more consumers are informed. We show profits may change non-monotonically in the mass of multi-homing consumers. A few multi-homers lead to increased profit whereas profits fall if the number of multi-homers is above a certain threshold.
Finally, we analyze multi-homing of sellers. We find that platforms can be hurt by the possibility that sellers multi-home. This result is in contrast to the existing literature which shows that multi-homing benefits platforms because platforms do no longer compete for multi-homing agents. Our result shows, however, that this is not true if agents (here sellers) compete against each other. The intuition is as follows: consider listing fees that lead to a segmentation equilibrium with single-homing sellers. If sellers can multi-home, a profitable deviation from the segmentation equilibrium may exits for each seller. This deviation is to multi-home and to serve buyers on both platforms.
This possibly breaks the segmentation equilibrium, in which platforms can earn positive profits. Then, only an agglomeration equilibrium exists, in which buyers observe all offers, and platforms end up competingà la Bertrand and receive zero profits.
Our paper contributes to the literature on competition in two-sided markets, pio- fees by applying a divide-conquer-strategy (i.e., negative prices on one side and positive prices on the other). Hagiu (2009) considers the effects of product variety on platform prices in a model with differentiated platforms, implying that both platforms are active in equilibrium. 3 None of these papers has considered the effect identified in our paper and analyzed how the market structure depends on seller competition.
In an early paper, Gehrig (1998) , considering Hotelling competition between platforms and competition on the circle (Salop, 1979) between sellers, analyzes the effect of transportation costs on entry and location of platforms. In contrast to our analysis, he is mainly interested in agglomeration equilibria. 4 Armstrong and Wright (2007) endogenize the decision of agents to single-home or to multi-homes (thereby endogenizing the market structure in a different way than we do) and determine how differentiation between platforms affects this choice.
Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2004) consider competition between two auction sides and analyze market thickness of the platforms. They show that concentration tends to be optimal but under some conditions sellers may prefer different platforms because this lowers the seller-buyer ratio on each platform and leads to (higher) expected prices. Hence, platforms can co-exist in equilibrium. In contrast to our paper, they do not consider how platforms can influence the market structure via their fees; instead they determine how the homing decision of agents affects the equilibrium. Lee (2014) considers a model with non-atomistic sellers and determines how bilateral contracting between platforms and sellers affects the market structure. He shows that even without competition between sellers, platforms may achieve segmentation, which leads to coexistence of platforms.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on competition in the Internet, in par- The intuition is that sellers still sell on their local market where buyers are not informed about all prices. This leads to price dispersion in equilibrium. Ronayne (2015) uses this framework and demonstrates that due to the website's fee, all prices increase in expectation, leading to lower surplus for buyers. Instead, our paper analyzes competition between websites and we obtain that price dispersion can occur not for sellers' prices but for the platforms.
Finally, our paper is connected to the literature obtaining mixed-strategy equilibria in price competition, as is often the case in the seach literature (Varian, 1980; Janssen and Moraga-Gozález, 2004) . If firms are symmetric, the prices in the mixing domain are usually atomless as the best response is to slightly undercut the rival's price. If firms are asymmetric, this is no longer true. The distribution of the firm with lower quality or higher cost often entails a mass point at the price where its profit equals zero (see e.g., Narasimhan, 1988, or De Corniére and Taylor, 2014) . In our equilibrium, mass points also exist with symmetric firms because the best responses involve a discrete increase or decrease in the price relative to the one of the rival.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next Section sets out the model. Section 3 determines the equilibrium. Section provides an extension to multi-homing firms and Section 5 analyzes the effects of multi-homing sellers. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
There are three types of agents in our model: platforms, firms, and consumers. We describe the agents in turn.
Platforms
Two homogeneous platforms A and B offer listing services. The platforms bring together sellers and buyers of products. To be active on platform i, a firm has to pay a listing fee f i , i ∈ {A, B}. Such listing or posting fees are prevalent in markets in which the platform cannot or does not monitor the sale of a product. For example, in the housing or the rental market, platforms posting ads usually charge listing fees. Also, the portal craigslist.org charges listing fees for posting ads for cars/trucks or therapeutic services.
Consumers can access platforms for free.
Firms
Firms (or sellers) have to decide which, if any, platform to join. In the base model, they cannot be active on both platforms (i.e., firms single-home) -in Section 5, we show that our main results carry over to the case with multi-homing firms. The product of each firm belongs to a product category. There is a mass 1 of such categories, indexed by 
Timing
The timing is as follows:
1. Platforms A and B set listing fees f A and f B , respectively.
2. Firms and consumers make a discrete choice between platform A and B, and the outside option (normalized to zero).
3. Firms in each category set product prices.
4. Consumers observe all offers on the platform they are visiting and make their buying decisions.
We make two observations regarding our setup: First, according to our timing firms decide where to list before setting their prices on the product market. This is the relevant timing in most applications because the decision on which platform to list is typically more long term than the pricing decision. In our setting, firms set prices after learning about the number of competitors in the product market. 7 Second, listing fees do not enter the pricing decisions of the firms in the third stage because they are "fixed" costs for firms (which are, in addition, sunk when firms set prices). Hence, the market for listing services is in fact two-sided in the sense of Rochet and Tirole (2006) .
Payoffs
For simplicity, we assume that all platform costs are zero. The profit of platform i is then the number of sellers active on platform i multiplied by the listing fee f i . The profit of a firm which is listed on platform i is 
Solution Concept
Our solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second stage, firms and consumers face a coordination game on which platform(s) to be active, which leads to a multiplicity of equilibria. To deal with this well-known problem in two-sided markets, we impose the refinement of Strong Nash Equilibrium (see e.g., Aumann, 1959 , or Bernheim et al., 1987 , that is, we select only Nash equilibria that are stable against deviations by coalitions of consumers and firms. In addition, if this concept is not sufficient to select a unique equilibrium, we select the equilibrium that is the profit dominant one for firms at this stage. We will show that the joint application of these refinements leads to a unique equilibrium at this stage and also at the full game.
A justification of the refinement is that the outcome is equivalent to the outcome of a sequential game in which sellers decide which platform to join before consumers do, as considered in the models by Hagiu (2006) and Lee (2014) , and sellers select the Strong Nash equilibrium. In Section 6, we analyze the mirror case, in which the Pareto dominant equilibrium for consumers is selected. The main insights of or analysis will be unchanged.
Finally, if consumers expects one firm in each category to list on platform A and the other firm on platform B, consumers are indifferent between the two platforms. We assume that in this case half of the consumers in each category join platform A and the other half platform B. A natural interpretation is that each consumer mixes with equal probability to be active either on platform A or B. Since there is a continuum of consumers, both platforms will in fact be patronized by 1/2 of the consumers. 8 As we point out below, this assumption is not crucial for the results and can be relaxed 8 Another interpretation is that platforms are differentiated by different platform designs (with half of the consumers in each category preferring platform A and the other half platform B) but that this differentiation is negligibly small. For example, platforms are differentiated along a Hotelling line and the transport cost parameter t goes to zero. This means that consumers ex ante have lexicographic preferences in the sense that they prefer the platform that has a higher probability to list a product in the consumer's preferred category. Only if consumers expect these probabilities to be the same across platforms, they decide according to their preference for different platform designs.
allowing for unequal distribution of consumers in case of indifference.
Examples on buyer-seller interaction
We provide two examples of widely-used demand functions in oligpoly (i.e., Hotelling and linear demand as in Singh and Vives, 1984) , to provide explicit expression for π d and π m . As an alternative to differentiated product oligpoly, one may use models in which firms after entry obtain private information about their marginal cost or in which there are differentially informed consumers within a product segment or consumers incur search costs.
Example 1: Hotelling.
Consider Hotelling competition in each product category. Each firm is located at one of the extreme points of the unit interval in a particular category; i.e., a firm j is characterized by its category k j and its location l j on the unit interval, (k j , l j ) ∈ 
Its profit is
Example 2: Linear demand for differentiated products by representative consumer.
Consider that consumers with the same preferred category have utility function v =
, expressing the degree of substitutabiliy between products. This is a representative consumer setting, where each consumer obtains utility from positive quantities of each product in her preferred category. Maximizing this utility function with respect to q 1 and q 2 , we obtain the indirect demand functions p i = 1 − q i − γq −i , i = 1, 2. Inverting this demand system yields the direct demand functions
Duopoly equilibrium profits are
For a monopolist, the direct demand is
and monopoly profits are
Equilibrium Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction. Consumers' choices in stage 4 and firms'
pricing decisions at stage 3 are straightforward: in the fourth stage, consumers buy a product in their preferred product category given that there is one according to their demand function. In the third stage, firms listed on a platform know whether they face a competitor in their product category or not. They therefore set price p d in case of competition and p m in case of monopoly. The set of Nash equilibria is visualized in Figure 1 . The left-hand side of the figure displays the case π d ≤ π m /2, whereas the right-hand side is the opposite case. In the figure, the agglomeration equilibrium on platform i, in which all sellers are active is abbreviated by AGG i (and by AGG AB if an agglomeration equilibrium on either platform exists), the stand-alone equilibrium with only half of the sellers being active is denoted by ST A i , and the segmentation equilibrium is denoted by SEG. As it can be seen on the left panel, there are regions in which all three equilibrium configurations exist. Figure 2 . By contrast, if
the Strong Nash refinement has no bite as the deviation is no longer profitable for sellers. Using seller dominance, however, now singles out a unique equilibrium. In particular, if
is more profitable for sellers than agglomeration. This is displayed in the left panel of We now turn to the range 1/4π m ≤ π d < 1/2π m . As we will show, in this range platforms randomize over subscription fees. The intuition for the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in this range is as follows: For any fee set by platform i, the competing platform −i's best response is to either set a lower fee to induce agglomeration on its platform or set a higher fee, which leads to firm segmentation, where platform −i receives higher profits than platform i. Suppose that platform i sets a relatively high fee. The competing platform −i then optimally sets a fee that is discontinuously lower, so as to just induce agglomeration. The optimal response of platform i is to lower its fee slightly and induce segmentation again. This sequence of best responses continues until the fee of platform i reaches a level that further adjustments by platform −i to induce agglomeration is no longer its best response, but instead platform −i prefers to set a fee that is discontinuously higher than the one of platform i, so as to just induce segmentation. In turn, it is then the best response of platform i to reduce its fee slightly to induce agglomeration. Therefore, the sequence continues and does not converge.
From the argument above, it is evident that the range of subscription fees over which platforms mix can be divided into two intervals, a lower and an upper interval. In the lower interval, fees are set with the intention to induce agglomeration. In the upper interval, fees are set with the intention to induce segmentation. 
The mixing probability is characterized by a cdf of
There is a mass point at f = 3/2π m − 3π d with point mass 1/4. The corresponding generalized density is given by
In the region of 3/8π m ≤ π d < 1/2π m , the upper bound of the lower interval coincides with the lower bound of the upper interval and platforms randomize over the interval
Setting a fee of 3/2π m − 3π d therefore induces segmentation with probability 1. There is a mass point on this fee 3/2π m − 3π d . Since the event that both firms choose this fee occurs with strictly positive probability, the expected equilibrium profit in this regime must equal 3/2π m − 3π d .
The cdf and the corresponding generalized density in the region of 3/8π Figures 1 and 2 , respectively. There is a mass point at 3/2π m − 3π d . 10 The mass point is at the fee which separates the interval of fees that are intended to induce agglomeration from those that are intended to induce segmentation. As explained above, the fee always leads to segmentation, and the platform's profit when charging this fee is certain.
The question arises why there is no mass point in the best response to 3/2π
In Varian's (1980) seminal model of sales indeed mass points can be excluded because of such a type of best response. The answer is that the best response is a downward jump in the fee (given that firms play the agglomeration equilibrium in case they are indifferent) 9 Because the distribution is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it fails to have a density. Nevertheless, we define a generalized density, which is a generalized function (since it will be comprised of a dirac delta function) such that integration against this generalized function yields the correct cumulative distribution function.
10 Mixed-strategy equilibria in symmetric oligopoly models typically do not feature mass points (e.g., Varian, 1980 , or Moraga-Gonzales and Janssen, 2004) . A number of contributions find mass points in asymmetric oligopoly models in which one firm is disadvantaged and therefore obtains zero profits in equilibrium; see, among others, Narasimhan (1988) and de Corniére and Taylor (2015). The maximal fee that platforms can possibly charge to obtain positive demand is 
There are mass points at f = 3π m /4 − π d and f = π m /2. The respective point masses
The corresponding generalized density is given by fee from the non-convex mixing region does strictly better. As a consequence, to render the fee infinitesimally below π d optimal, the rival platform must set the highest fee with a strictly positive probability. Otherwise, a fee infinitesimally below π d can never be part of the mixing domain, and an equilibrium would fail to exist. Again, reacting to a fee of π m /2 by also playing the best response (i.e. the fee infinitesimally below π d ) with strictly positive probability cannot be optimal because this is not the optimal reaction to all fees in the upper interval. The argument why only a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in the first and second mixing region is reminiscent of Bertrand-Edgeworth-cycles. However, different from these cycles, in our equilibrium, platforms charge different subscriptions fees because one of them intends to induce agglomeration whereas the other intends to induce segmentation.
This can lead to two disjoint intervals from which subscription fees are chosen, something which cannot happen in a Bertrand-Edgeworth cycle.
In the two examples given in the previous section, the degree of competition determines π d relative to π m . Therefore, the boundaries of the regions can be expressed with the parameter indicating how differentiated firms are.
In the Hotelling example, this degree is given by t, that is, a higher t represents more differentiation. We obtain that the agglomeration region occurs for t ≥ (v − c)/2, We note that the (expected) equilibrium platform profit as a function of π d is continuous and has three kinks. The profit is 0 for 
Multi-Homing of Consumers
So far, we focused on the case in which consumers are single-homing. In this section, we show that our qualitative results extend to multi-homing consumers, as long as not all consumers multi-home.
To this end, assume that a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of consumers join both platforms.
An interpretation is that consumers incur some time cost to be active on the second platform. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to these time costs, implying that only those consumers with low enough time costs are active on both platforms. A higher α can then be interpreted as a reduction in time costs.
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The profits of the firms need then to be modified. In fact, a firm will never obtain the Firms do not know which consumer is a single-homing and which one is a multihoming one and set a single price in the product market. Since single-homers are less price-sensitive than the multi-homers, the equilibrium price with only single-homers is larger than that with only multi-homers. Hence, with a single price in the product market, the equilibrium price depends on α. We can therefore write the expected profit that a firm obtains from a consumer as π(α). In particular, π(0) = π m and π(1) = π d .
As α gets larger, we obtain π (α) ≤ 0; hence, for all α
we will show how a change in α plays out in the two examples of demand functions.
12
Deriving the equilibrium with multi-homing consumers, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5. All results of Propositions 1 to 4 carry over to the case of consumer multi-homing with the exception that π m /2 needs to be replaced by
The proposition shows that the qualitative result of Propositions 1 to 4 remains valid 11 For example, if distribution S of time costs among consumers first-order stochastically dominates distribution S , then the latter distribution leads to a higher fraction α of multi-homing consumers. 12 In any agglomeration equilibrium, a firm's profit is unchanged since all consumers see both offers. This leads to a profit of π d for each firm.
if consumers can multi-home. With multi-homing consumers, segmentation does not give firms monopoly power over their consumers. Segmentation nevertheless lowers the competitive pressure because some consumers are still only informed about one firm's offer, and this will be exploited by platforms.
The question arises if platforms benefit from multi-homing of consumers. If we are in the range of the agglomeration equilibrium, nothing changes compared to single-homing consumers because platforms are in Bertrand competition. However, this is not true for the regions in which the segmentation equilibrium occurs with some or full probability.
There are two countervailing forces. First, platforms have more consumers, which leads to a larger demand for firms. This allows platforms to charge higher listing fees and is therefore beneficial to platforms' profits. This effect can also be seen in the formulas:
Instead of serving a consumer mass of 1/2 (as with single-homing consumers), platforms now have a mass of (1+α)/2 of consumers. However, the countervailing force is that firms make smaller profits in the product market because some consumers are now informed about both offers. As can be seen in the formulas, the profit is now π(α) < π m . It follows that platforms are hurt by the possibility of consumers to multi-home if the competition effect dominates the demand-enhancing effect.
We can illustrate this result with the example of the concrete demand functions. In the case of Hotelling demand, π(α) is given by
Comparing π(α)(1 + α)/2 with π m /2, we obtain a non-monotonic effect in α. Taking the derivative of π(α)(1 + α)/2 − π m /2 with respect to α at α = 0 yields (v − c)/8 > 0.
This implies that platforms benefit from a small fraction of multi-homing consumers.
However, as α gets larger the difference between π(α)(1 + α)/2 and π m /2 falls in α. (In the limit, as α → 1, π(α)(1 + α)/2 → π d , implying that for the whole parameter range, only the agglomeration equilibrium with zero profits for platforms exist.)
A similar picture arises with the linear demand example. Here,
Taking the derivative of π(α)(1 + α)/2 − π m /2 with respect to α at α = 0 yields (α − c) 2 /(8(β + γ) > 0. Therefore, a small fraction of multi-homing consumers increases platforms' profits in this case as well.
Multi-Homing of Firms
In this section we consider the effects of multi-homing of firms. In contrast to consumers, firms need to pay for being active on the platforms. Therefore, even without any costs for using a second platform, firms do not necessarily find it profitable to join both platforms.
We therefore proceed in a different way than in the last section by assuming that firms decide to single-home or to multi-home (or not to participate at all). They do not incur any intrinsic costs from doing so but need to pay the listing fees. We are particularly interested if platforms benefit from the possibility that firms can multi-home.
The literature on two-sided markets predicts that platforms can exploit the multi-homing side because they do not compete for agents on this side (see e.g., Armstrong, 2006, or Hagiu, 2006 ). The question is if this is also true in our framework in which agents compete against each other.
With multi-homing firms, new possibilities for the distribution of firms come into play. First, both firms in a segment may multi-home. In that case, all consumers are exposed to the offer of both firms, implying that each firm receives the duopoly profit π d per consumer. But the profit per consumer is then equivalent to that in the situation where both firms agglomerate on one platform. In the latter case, however, firms only have to pay the listing fee of one platform. Therefore, the agglomeration equilibrium configuration is weakly preferred by firms. In fact, firms are indifferent only if both listing fees are zero. We assume that firms choose the agglomeration equilibrium then.
This assumption is without loss of generality because both configurations give rise to the same surplus for all agents.
Second, a configuration is possible in which one firm in a category single-homes and the other one multi-homes. 13 Competition in the product market works then differently to the situation described above. In particular, denote the mass of consumers on the platform on which both firms are active by x and the mass on the platform in which only one firm is active by 1 − x. Then, there is asymmetric competition in the product market. A mass 1−x of consumers can only buy from the multi-homing firm whereas the remaining mass can buy from both firms. Let us denote the profit of the multi-homing firm by π M H (1 − x) and the profit of the single-homing firm by π SH (x). To save on notation we denote π SH (1/2) by π SH and π M H (1/2) by π M H .
14 Finally, with multi-homing firms, the situation can occur in which there are multiple equilibria in the fee-setting game between platforms. If this occurs, we use as a selection 13 This situation can never occur in equilibrium because the best response of consumers is then to join the platform on which both firms are active. Multi-homing is then not a best response because the firm receives no consumers on one of the platforms where it is active. However, the configuration can occur as a potential deviation.
14 We will provide the formulas in the examples with our demand functions below.
criterion that platforms coordinate on the profit-dominant equilibrium.
We can now establish the equilibrium with multi-homing firms.
Proposition 6.
• In the agglomeration and segmentation region, the equilibrium is the same as that characterized in Propositions 1 and 2.
• In the first mixing region, the equilibrium is the same as that characterized in
Similarly, in the second mixing region, the equilibrium is the same as that charac-
• In the first and second mixing region, for
respectively, in equilibrium platforms set fees of f A = f B = 0 and firms play an agglomeration equilibrium.
The proposition shows that for some parameter constellations, the equilibrium derived in Propositions 1 to 4 stays unchanged. Foremost, if competition between firms is relatively fierce, the segmentation equilibrium still exists. Although firms can multihome, this reduces their profits by too large an amount and so they prefer segmentation.
Again platforms exploit this by charging high listing fees. Therefore, our insight that segmentation leads to high platform profits although platforms are homogeneous, is robust to multi-homing of firms.
The proposition also shows that the equilibrium with segmentation occurs for a smaller parameter range than in case of single-homing firms. In the range in which segmentation no longer occurs with multi-homing firms, platforms charge zero listing fees and obtain zero profits. We therefore obtain the result that platforms can exploit agents less if agents multi-home-a result in contrast to the standard insight derived on two-sided markets.
The intuition behind the result is as follows: homogeneous platforms make positive profits because they allow firms to segment themselves and thereby reduce competition in the product market. If firms can multi-home, segmentation may break down because firms have an incentive to deviate from the segmentation equilibrium. As can be seen in the proposition, segmentation is more likely to break down if the profit of a multihoming firm π M H becomes large. As a result, platforms can no longer charge high fees and exploit the possibility that they grant monopoly power to firms. The homogeneity of the platforms then drives fees and profits down to zero and, due to the indirect network effects, firms choose agglomeration.
We can illustrate the result with the help of the two examples of Hotelling and linear demand. Determining π M H for Hotelling demand yields
Comparing The result is even more extreme for the linear demand example. Here,
Comparing this with
Since the first and second mixing regions are relevant for γ between 0.62β and 0.85β, we obtain that the segmentation equilibrium does not exist in these regions.
Buyer-Preferred Equilibrium
In this subsection, we demonstrate how our equilibrium selection would change if we Turning to the first stage, if π d < 1/4π m , platforms set their fees in equilibrium (i.e., f A = f B = π m /2) so that the segmentation configuration is still an equilibrium of the full game.
15 15 There also exists an equilibrium in which platforms set their fees equal to zero, thereby inducing agglomeration. However, since platforms obtain zero profits in such an equilibrium, the one with fees of π m /2 is Pareto dominant for platforms. 
Conclusion
We propose a model of competing platforms that bring together buyers and sellers. Platforms are homogeneous and set listing fees to sellers who compete and against each other in the product market. Generally speaking, we have analyzed how the competitive environment between agents on one side of the market affects the platform market structure.
Based on the Bertrand logic adjusted to platform markets, one may expect that, due to positive network effects, only one platform will be active in the market. Since platforms obtain zero profits in the agglomeration equilibrium, multihoming of sellers hurts platforms. This insight contrasts with results from two-sided markets with differentiated platforms, which finds that multi-homing agents can be exploited because platforms do not compete for them (e.g., Armstrong, 2006 ).
In our model, we assumed that platforms do not incur fixed costs independent of the number of participants the platform is catering to. If platforms had (arbitrarily small) fixed cost, instead of an agglomeration equilibrium with zero profits for both platforms, 16 with endogenous entry, only one platform would be present in the market and the market would be a natural monopoly. Thus, with fixed costs only one platform is present and obtains a large profit when there is little competition between sellers. In such a setting fierce competition between sellers is needed to avoid monopolization of the platform market.
8 Appendix
Appendix A: Equilibrium Selection in Stage 2
We start by determining all Nash equilibria in stage 2, given {f i , f −i }. In a second step, we show how the refinement of Strong Nash plus profit dominance of sellers singles out a unique equilibrium.
First suppose that the mass of sellers is unequal on both platforms, i.e., α i sellers are on platform i and α −i < α i sellers are on platform −i. Then all consumers will join platform i. This implies that the sellers on platform −i have a profitable deviation to either go the platform i or be inactive for any f −i > 0. It follows that in equilibrium either one platform has no sellers and no consumers, or α i = α −i , which makes consumers indifferent and induces them to split equally between the two platforms.
We start with the first type of equilibrium, in which one platform is inactive. As sellers are homogeneous across categories, there cannot be an equilibrium in which sellers in different categories follow different strategies. The reason is that if it is profitable for one or both sellers in some categories to list on a platform, this must also be true for the remaining categories. Given this, there are two equilibrium confidurations in which only one platform is active.
The first configuration is an agglomeration equilibrium, in which all sellers and all buyers agglomerate on one platform. A seller's profit is then π d . Hence, an equilibrium in which agglomeration on platform i takes place exists if f i ≤ π d , independent of f −i . 17 The second equilibrium configuration is stand-alone equilibrium, in which in each category only one seller is active on platform i and all consumers go to platform i. This
This equilibrium cannot occur with f i < π d , as then both sellers in each category prefer to be active on platform i.
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We now turn to the third Nash equilibrium type in which α i = α −i . There are three possibilities for α i = α −i to arise.
(i) In each category, one seller lists on platform i and one seller lists on platform −i.
(ii) In 1/2 of the categories, both sellers list on platform i and in the other half both sellers list on platform −i.
(iii) In 1/2 of the categories, one seller lists on platform i and in the other half one seller lists on platform −i.
Note that it can never be an equilibrium that in fewer than 1/2 of the categories both or one seller list on platform i and platform −i. The reason is that in the categories, in which sellers are not active, they must have a profitable deviation to become active. This is because platform fees must be such that the resulting profits are are higher than the listing fees as otherwise there can be no categories in which sellers are willing to list.
We now show that possibilities (ii) and (iii) can never occur in equilibrium. Consider case (ii). Since in 1/2 of the categories, both sellers are active on platform i, we must have
If a seller active on platform −i then deviates to platform i, its profit changes
can only be an equilibrium if
, both conditions cannot hold jointly, implying that there must be profitable deviation. Similarly, in case (iii) platform fees must be smaller than π m /2, which implies that non-active sellers have a profitable deviation to list on the platform in which the competitor is not active.
As a consequence, the configuration in which both platforms are active can only be such that each platform is host to one seller in each category. This equilibrium can only occur if platform fees are below π m /2 and no seller has an incentive to switch to the other platform because it can achieve a higher profit there. The latter condition implies
Rewriting this condition, we obtain that a segmentation equilibrium exists if and only if
As can be visualized in Figure 1 , for any combination of listing fees
multiple equilibria exist in stage 2.
We now demonstrate how our selection rule singles out a unique equilibrium. We start with the cases in which only a single equilibrium configuration exists (i.e., agglomeration or stand-alone) but multiple equilibria occur because agents can coordinate on either We turn to the case π d ≤ π m /2. We first show that a similar mechanism as the one in the previous paragraph does only partly work then. In particular, a seller on platform i (i.e., the platform with the higher fee) wants to deviate from the segmentation equilibrium if and only if π
If this inequality holds, the segmentation equilibrium is not a Strong Nash one. This shrinks the range for the segmentation equilibrium. In particular, for fees below π d , the equilibrium was valid for f i ≤ (π m − π d )/2 + f −i without the refinement, whereas with the refinement it is valid only if
, the refinement of Strong Nash has no bite. However, the refinement of profitdominance for sellers then selects the segmentation equilibrium as the unique equilibrium.
In particular, the inequality ensures that sellers on platform i are better off in the segmentation equilibrium than in the agglomeration equilibrium, and the condition π d < 19 If both fees are above π d there is now restriction because the agglomeration equilibrium does not exist then. π m /2 guarantees that also sellers on platform −i prefer segmentation over agglomeration
Therefore, our equilibrium refinement selects a unique equilibrium for all {f i ≤ π m , f −i ≤ π m }. This unique equilibrium can be written as follows:
-for all other values, the equilibrium is
Appendix B: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Agglomeration equilibrium. Suppose that the agglomeration equilibrium is played in the second stage. A firm's profit in this equilibrium is
it is listed on platform i. It follows that a firm is willing to participate as long as
Therefore, an agglomeration equilibrium can be obtained with fees (
We focus on equilibria, which are preferred by the firms at stage 2. Firms and consumers will therefore coordinate on the equilibrium at stage 2 such that they list on the platform with the lower fee. As a consequence, all agglomeration equilibria with strictly positive listing fees do not survive our selection criteron. It follows that there is a unique equilibrium within the set of all agglomeration equilibria that survives our Suppose that platform i deviates to induce an agglomeration equilibrium in the second stage such that all participate on platform i. To do so, it needs to charge a lower fee Proof of Proposition 3. Convex randomization domain. We first show the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Consider the region of π m /4 ≤ π d < π m /2. We know that, in this region, a pure-strategy segmentation equilibrium will be played in the second stage if both platforms charge the same listing fees (conditional on these fees being lower than π m /2, which will always be fulfilled in equilibrium). However, platforms cannot extract the full profits from firms because then each platform will have an incentive to deviate and induce firms and consumers to play an agglomeration equilibrium. We proceed by first determining the highest fee that platforms can charge to make such a downward deviation unprofitable. Suppose that both platforms charge a fee of π m /2 − x.
The platforms' resulting profit is then π m /2 − x, whereas the profit of a firm is x. If platform i deviates to attract all firms and consumers in the second stage, it must offer firms at least a profit of x. This implies that its fee must be such that π d − f Randomization domain. We now derive the randomization domain of the first mixed strategy equilibrium using platforms' best responses. Suppose platform j sets a fee f j to induce segmentation. This implies that a firm on platform j receives a profit of π m /2−f j and the platform j receives a profit of f j . f j must not be higher than π m /2. We know derive the maximum and the minimum of platform i = j's best response to f j . Given f j , the best downward deviation f dev − i just triggers agglomeration on platform i, i.e., firms prefer agglomeration on i to segmentation on j:
This yields platform i a deviation profit of 2f
For the same f j , the best upward deviation f dev + i induces segmentation with the highest possible fee on platform i, i.e., firms (weakly) prefer segmentation on i to agglomeration on j:
This leads to a deviation profit of f
The two deviation profits are equal at
and platform i obtains no profit then. This can be expressed as follows
Let us start with the case in which platform i charges a fee in the lower range, that is, f i ∈ [2δ, 3δ]. Denote the cumulative density function with which platform j mixes by G(f j ). The profit of platform i when setting fees in this lower range is then given by (abbreviating f i by f )
In equilibrium, this must be equal to 3δ, yielding a first equation of
This equation determines the mixing probabilities of platform j in its upper range. This is because only if platform j sets a fee above f + δ (which happens with probability 1 − G(f + δ)), firms will agglomerate on platform i. Such a fee must necessarily be in the upper range.
In case platform i charges a fee from the upper range, that is, f i ∈ [3δ, 4δ], the equation is
This equation determines the mixing probability in the lower range.
Let us first look at (2). We can substitute h ≡ f + δ to get
Therefore, h is the fee in the upper range. Recall that (2) was relevant for f in the lower range and since h = f + δ, these are exactly the fees in the upper range. Solving (4) for
It is easy to check that G(4δ) = 1.
Now we turn to (3). Here we can substitute h ≡ f − δ representing that h is now in the lower range. We obtain
Solving (6) for G(h) gives
It is easy to check that G(2δ) = 0. Using (5) and (7), we obtain lim Intuitively, equation (3) requires a sufficiently low probability of f − δ being close to 3δ because otherwise setting f close to 4δ would lead to zero profit too often due to an agglomeration equilibrium in the lower range. A profitable deviation because of the mass point at 3δ is ruled out by equation (2) and (3).
The resulting mixing probability is characterized by a cdf of
Because the distribution is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it fails to have a density. Nevertheless, we define a generalized density, which is a generalized function (since it will be comprised of a dirac delta function) such that integration against this generalized function yields the correct desired probabilities. The corresponding probability density function is given by
where 
In equilibrium, this must be equal to δ + 2η, yielding a first equation of
This equation determines the mixing probabilities of platform j in its upper range.
In case platform i charges a fee from the upper range, that is,
Let us first look at (8) . We can substitute h ≡ f + η to get
Therefore, h is the fee in the upper range. Recall that (8) was relevant for f in the lower range and since h = f + η, these are exactly the fees in the upper range. Solving (10) for G(h) gives
It is easy to check that lim
Moreover, it holds that lim
G(f ) = 3δ/(2δ + η) < 1, which implies the existence of a mass point with mass 1−3δ/(2δ +η) = (η −δ)/(2δ +η) at h = 2δ +2η. The intuition for this result is that equation (8) is barely satisfied for f close to f = 2δ + η because the support of G is a non-convex set and f = 2δ + η < δ + 2η, the expected profit. In order to satisfy this equation, there must be a positive probability of triggering an agglomeration equilibrium and receiving 2f in the lower range even for f = f . This is achieved by a mass point at h = 2δ + 2η = f . Note that in the lower range, a profitable deviation from the mass point at 2δ + 2η is ruled out by equation (8) . We show next that 2δ + 2η also satisfies the equilibrium condition.
Consider (9) . Here we can substitute h ≡ f − η representing that h is now in the lower range. We obtain
(1 − G(h)) (h + η) = δ + 2η.
Solving (12) for G(h) gives
It is easy to check that G(f ) = G(δ + η) = 0, whereas lim G(f ) = δ/(δ + η), which implies the existence of a second mass point with mass δ/(2(δ + η)) at h = δ + 2η.
Intuitively, equation (3) requires a sufficiently low probability of f − η being close to f = 2δ + η because otherwise setting f close to f = 2δ + 2η would lead to zero profit too often due to an agglomeration equilibrium in the lower range. A profitable deviation because of the mass point at δ + 2η is ruled out by equation (8) and (9).
The resulting mixing probability is characterized by a cdf of Instead, if firms agglomerate, all single-homing consumers also choose the platform where firms agglomerate and the total number of consumers per firm is 1.
In the latter case, the profit of a firm is π d . If a firm in a category deviates and is active on the other platform, it offers its products only to the mass α of multi-homing consumers who have seen both offers. The firm's profit is then απ d < π d . Therefore, a deviation is not profitable, implying that an agglomeration equilibrium exists, given that a platform's fee is lower (or equal) than π d . If firms segment (and single-homing consumers follow suit), the profit of each firm is π(α)(1 + α)/2. If a firm in a category deviates, it obtains a profit of π d (1 + α)/2 < π(α)(1 + α)/2. As a consequence, an segmentation equilibrium exists, if platforms charge fees lower (or equal) to π(α)(1 + α)/2.
Again, only these two types of equilibria can exist. There can never be an equilibrium in which firms in some categories choose segmentation whereas in others they choose agglomeration. The reason is that in this case all single-homing consumers are active on the platform with a larger number of firms (say, platform i). Therefore, the total number of consumers on the two platforms is x i = 1 and x −i = α. But then in all categories in which firms segment, the firm on platform −i wants to deviate and go to platform i because it obtains a profit of π d per consumer on both platforms but platform i has a larger number of consumers.
Having established that there are only two types of equilibria in the second stage,
we can now move to the first-stage choices of the platforms. Agglomeration is preferred from the firms' perspective if
Following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that in this range an agglomeration equilibrium with fees f i = f −i = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Similarly, if both platforms charge a fee of π(α)(1 + α)/2, the only equilibrium is that firms segment, and a platform's profit equals π(α)(1 + α)/4. A platform has no incentive to deviate from this fee combination, if
Hence, in this range, the unique equilibrium involves f i = f −i = π(α)(1 + α)/2 and firms segment.
It is evident, that the regions are the same as in case where α = 0 but π m /2 is replaced by π(α)(1 + α)/2. The same logic applies for the region
By following the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 1 to 4, we obtain the same results as in those propositions.
Proof of Proposition 6. As before, we start with the potential equilibrium configurations at stage 2. For any set of listing fees, there can be three potential configurations. First, an agglomeration equilibrium, in which in each category both firms and all consumers are active on only one platform, and firms obtain a gross profit of π d . Second, a segmentation equilibrium, in which in each category firms and consumers segment and firms obtain a gross profit of π m /2. Third, all firms multi-home in equilibrium, consumers split equally on both platforms and firm earn π d . There can never be an equilibrium with partial multi-homing, that is, in some categories only one firm multi-homes, because then all consumers would join the platform on which both firms are active. The multi-homing firm's best response is then to single-home on the platform where all consumers are active.
We now move to the first stage and examine the equilibrium in the fee-setting game of platforms. First, note that in the agglomeration and in the multi-homing equilibrium, firms' profits are equal to π d . From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that the agglomeration equilibrium involves listing fees of zero. If one firm sets a positive listing fee, it is better for all firms to choose agglomeration on the other platform instead of coordinating on the multi-homing equilibrium. This is because the gross profit in both equilibria is π d and firms can save listing fees by agglomerating. As a consequence, the multi-homing equilibrium can only exist if both platforms charge a listing fee of zero.
The outcome of the multi-homing and the agglomeration equilibrium is then equivalent.
As stated in the man text, without loss of generality, we assume that firms will play the agglomeration equilibrium in this case. We can therefore focus on the conditions under which the agglomeration and the segmentation equilibrium exist.
First, we know that in the agglomeration region, given that f A = f B = 0, firms obtain higher profits in the agglomeration than in the segmentation equilibrium. Therefore, in this region the agglomeration equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
If π m /2 > π d , firms obtain higher profits when separating instead of agglomerating ,
given that f A = f B = 0. However, in contrast to the previous analysis, segmentation is not necessarily an equilibrium of the second stage even if π m /2 > π d and f A = f B = 0. This is because a firm can multi-home. In particular, suppose that platforms set f A = f B = 0, and firms and consumers in the second stage play the segmentation equilibrium.
The profit of each firm is then π m /2. By deviating to multi-homing, a firms obtains a profit of π M H -we recall that π M H is the profit a firm receives when it multi-homes, the competitor single-homes, and consumers are split equally on the two platforms. Hence,
the separating equilibrium does not exist for f A = f B = 0.
We will now show that an equilibrium, in which both listing fees are equal to zero and firms play the agglomeration equilibrium exists for π M H > π m /2. First, note that neither a single firm nor a single consumer have an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium because no agent is active on the other platform. Second, since the segmentation
